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In this paper we aim to remedy some shortcomings in the economic literature
on university student absenteeism and academic performance. We start by
introducing a simple theoretical model in which students decide the optimal
allocation of their time between lecture attendance, self-study and leisure.
Under some speciﬁc assumptions, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between lec-
ture attendance and time devoted to self-study in each course, from which we
infer that estimates of student performance regressions which omit self-study
might be biased. Thus, we estimate an academic performance regression us-
ing data from ﬁrst year undergraduate students of economics in the academic
year 1998-99 at the University of Ancona (Italy) and ﬁnd evidence that once
self-study time is controlled for, the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of lec-
ture attendance for some courses disappears. This is likely to be important
especially when student performance regressions are used to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of course attendance and to inform the debate on the introduction
of mandatory attendance on some courses to enhance student performance.
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1 Introduction
The methodology commonly used by educational economists to analyze stu-
dent performance is the so-called educational production function. However,
diﬀerent authors have focused on diﬀerent aspects. In particular, it is pos-
sible to distinguish two main ways of interpreting educational production
functions. Some researchers are mainly interested in the eﬀect on student
performance of the characteristics of educational institutions (mainly primary
and secondary schools), which include class size, teacher-student ratios, ex-
penditure per student, diﬀerences between public and private institutions1
In those studies students are usually treated as the ‘raw material’ that ed-
ucational institutions transform into the ﬁnal product and they are given a
completely passive role. On the other side there are studies focusing on stu-
dent behaviour, namely student time allocation, and its eﬀect on academic
performance. The present paper is mainly concerned with this second stream
of the economic literature.
We believe that the study of student time allocation and the assessment
of the eﬀect of class attendance and self-study on academic performance are
of interest to a number of individuals.
Students are certainly interested in knowing what allocation of time is
more productive, in the sense of ensuring the highest academic performance,
and the amount of work required to pass a certain exam or to graduate in a
subject.
¤Paper to be presented at the XIV annual conference of the European Association of
Labour Economists (Paris, 19-22 September 2002) and at the XVII annual conference of
the Associazione Italiana degli Economisti del Lavoro (Salerno, 27-27 September 2002).
We would like to thank participants at seminars at the University of Ancona, at the annual
conference of the Association Fran¸ caise des Sciences Economiques (16-17 May 2002, Lyon)
and Roberto Esposti for useful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1See for instance Lazear (2001) for an analysis of the eﬀect of class size and Pritchett
and Filmer (1999) for some evidence on educational expenditures.
1Educational institutions may obtain useful insights for several reasons.
Firstly, they can decide on the number of credits to be attributed to in-
dividual courses, according to the workload that each of them requires of
students. Secondly, they can evaluate the optimal lecturing time for each
course. Thirdly, they can investigate factors aﬀecting student performance.
This may also be useful for student selection procedures, so that students
with higher prospective academic performance are selected.
Last but not least, the government and the taxpayers may be interested
in the eﬃcient and eﬀective allocation of public expenditure (e.g. is it worth
increasing the number of teaching staﬀ, or ﬁnancing longer teaching hours?)
and in the ranking of institutions according to student performance.2
In this paper, we account for the potential endogeneity of student time
allocation and study the eﬀect of self-study time and lecture attendance
time on the academic performance of ﬁrst year undergraduate students of
economics.
The paper outline is as follows: the next section reviews the empirical
literature on student time allocation and academic performance; section three
introduces a simple theoretical model of student time allocation and academic
performance. Section four presents the empirical analysis and section ﬁve
concludes.
2 Previous literature
After about nine years since the publication of Romer (1993), who observed a
strong positive correlation between students’ class attendance and academic
performance, and a number of other studies partly in response to and partly
motivated by Romer’s ﬁndings, we were surprised by the relative absence in
the economic literature of theoretical and empirical models studying educa-
tional performance from the students’ side, that is, starting from analysis of
student time allocation and assessing its eﬀect on academic performance.
We believe that standard economic theory is able to oﬀer useful insights
into student behaviour, the learning process and the eﬀect of policy inter-
ventions, such as the introduction of a mandatory attendance policy.
We start with a brief summary of some related literature on student time
allocation and academic performance.
2For instance, the Performance Indicators Steering Group (PISG), established in 1997
in the UK with the primary aim of constructing Performance Indicators (PIs) for the UK
university system, regularly produces on a regular basis PIs based on student progression
and degree outcomes (see HEFCE 1999).
2Schmidt (1983) uses data from an experiment run in the fall of 1970 at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in the Macroeconomics Principles course.
His data set includes 216 students and provides a wealth of information
concerning student allocation of time. Schmidt estimates a Cobb-Douglas
educational production function using both OLS and Full Information Max-
imum Likelihood (FIML). Using OLS he ﬁnds an elasticity of performance
with respect to hours of class attendance of 0.215 and of study hours of 0.017.
Therefore hours spent attending lectures are far more productive than hours
spent studying at home. He then uses FIML and a latent variable approach
(in which time and ability are treated as unobservable or latent variables),
which takes account of possible simultaneity between performance and stu-
dent time allocation (and the endogeneity of lecture attendance and study
hours), ﬁnding that the productivity of study hours is slightly lower than
that of lecture attendance (i.e. a 0.348% increase in study hours produces the
same gain of performance as does increasing lecture attendance by 0.480%).
Romer (1993) uses data from three U.S. schools classiﬁed by the Barron’s
Proﬁles of American Colleges (1991 edition) as ‘highly competitive’, the sec-
ond highest of six categories, and on Intermediate Macroeconomics courses
(the full sample size is 195 individuals). Romer recognizes that attendance
is endogenous and that his analysis cannot isolate the causal impact of class
attendance on learning and performance, although he believes that it can
provide ‘some suggestive evidence’ (p. 171). The author runs regressions of
student performance in level on fraction of lectures attended, both excluding
and including some proxies for motivation. The eﬀect of class attendance is
always positive and signiﬁcant; however, its magnitude is greatly reduced by
the inclusion of proxies for motivation.3 In the light of this evidence Romer
suggests that perhaps a policy of mandatory attendance might enhance stu-
dent academic performance.
Durden and Ellis (1995) use data on a Principles of Economics course
taught at a medium-size, comprehensive state university (the sample includes
346 students). The authors ﬁnd, using OLS, that ‘the typical student is not
adversely aﬀected by a few absences... but excessive absenteeism is associated
strongly with poor academic performance’ (p. 345) and that measures of
student motivation or prior educational performance are the most important
determinants of student performance.
Devadoss and Foltz (1996) use data from the University of Idaho, Wash-
ington State University, Purdue University and Ohio State University, on
Agricultural Economics classes for about 400 students. Using seemingly un-
related regression (SUR) techniques, in order to take into account the simul-
3Which might be correlated also with study time.
3taneity of class attendance and class performance, they ﬁnd that motivation
positively aﬀects attendance and attendance positively aﬀects class perfor-
mance. According to their results hours of study have a negative impact on
student performance. This ﬁnding may be somewhat surprising, however the
authors consider in their model hours of study as exogenous.
Chan, Shum and Wright (1997) use data on students in two sections of a
Principles of Finance course at a Mid-Western, regional, state university (the
full sample comprises 71 individuals). The authors use both Tobit and Heck-
man two-stage procedures in order to take account of the students’ survival
process in the course. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship between
attendance and student performance in the Tobit model and a insigniﬁcant
relationship using Heckman selection procedure. Moreover, a mandatory at-
tendance policy appears not to improve performance.
Dolton, Marcenaro and Navarro (2001) use data from the University of
Malaga drawn from a survey conducted in April 1999 on ﬁrst and ﬁnal year
students. Their sample includes 3722 observations taken from students from
forty diﬀerent subject areas. They ﬁnd that lectures are four times more
productive than self-study in the linear speciﬁcation of the stochastic educa-
tional performance while in the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation the elasticity of
performance with respect to lecture attendance is twice than that of study
time (on average 0.02 and 0.01 respectively). It is worth noting that their
estimates may be aﬀected by selection bias since data were collected dur-
ing a class. The authors address the problem of the potential endogenity of
pre-university performance but neglect that of student time allocation.
Therefore, the ﬁndings of this literature do not seem to be uncontrover-
sial. In particular, by focusing on studies of class attendance and student
performance omitting student self-study, the estimates are likely to be biased.
In fact, there may be several sources of correlation between hours of lectures
attended and hours studied, such as students’ motivation or the preference
for leisure, which cannot be controlled for perfectly. This suggests that the
eﬀect of student absenteeism on student performance estimated from educa-
tional production functions omitting student self-study is likely to be upward
biased. This is also the reason why one should be very careful in obtaining
counterfactuals on the eﬀect of mandatory attendance policies from those
models. In particular, what will the reaction of students be to a manda-
tory attendance policy? Will they maintain the same hours of self-study
or will they reduce (or increase) them? Will their academic performance
be increased or not? Secondly, even in models which include both hours of
lecture attendance and hours of study some factors may aﬀect both student
time allocation and academic performance, so that there are likely to be
simultaneity problems.
4In light of these considerations, in this paper we aim to remedy some
shortcoming in the existing literature by modeling theoretically and estimat-
ing empirically the process of student time allocation between alternative
uses and the eﬀect of class attendance and self-study on student university
performance. In our framework both hours of study and class attendance
are endogenous variables, whose optimal values are the outcome of the util-
ity maximizing behaviour of ‘rational students’.
3 A simple model of student behaviour and
student academic performance
We analyze an individual who has decided to undertake higher education
in order to obtain a degree in a given subject in a certain number of years,
namely the course’s legal duration,4 which we normalize to one (ﬁrst period).5
After graduation, in the second period the individual starts working. To
simplify the notation here we drop the index for the individuals, although all
the parameters and the exogenous variables of the model are likely to diﬀer
across students, introducing individual heterogeneity. We suppose that the
student’s utility can be deﬁned as:
U = u(c1;`1) + ¯u(c2;`2) (1)
where:
1. ¯ depends on the relative duration of working life with respect to the
period devoted to higher education6 and on the discount rate;
2. `1 = 1¡
PN
i=1(si+°ai) is leisure time in the ﬁrst period, with si denoting
time devoted to self-study and ai time devoted to course attendance in
4We assume here that the expected duration of the course is exogenous and equal across
individuals. This assumption may not be too strong during the ﬁrst year of enrollment
(analyzed in the empirical work) before students take university exams. However, after
taking some exams and observing the results it is likely that students will revise their
expectations about the time required to graduate. According to our simplifying assump-
tion students with diﬀerent levels of ability have diﬀerent expected grades but an equal
expected course duration at enrollment.
5We do not address here the issues of the decision to enroll in higher education or that
of the university subject. For a detailed analysis of the former in the case of Italy see
for instance Gambetta (1987) while for an analysis of the latter for the same country see
Bratti and Staﬀolani (2001).
6The utility function could have been written as: U = Hu(c1;`1) + (T ¡ H)½u(c2;`2)
where H is the legal duration of the university course, T the end of the planning horizon
and ½ the discount rate. Dividing by H and deﬁning ¯ ´
(T¡H)
H ½ we obtain equation (1).
5the course i; N is the total number of exams to be passed and ° > 1 is a
coeﬃcient which takes account of the fact that °ai hours are necessary
to produce ai hours of lecture attendance and depends on travel times;
3. `2 = `2 is leisure time in the second period, which we assume to be
exogenous.7 Hence (1¡`2) is the exogenous labour supply in the second
period;
4. c1 = c1 is ﬁrst period consumption which is equal to exogenous revenue
from the family or the institutions (such as scholarships) net of the cost
of education during the period of study;8
5. c2 is second period consumption; we assume that it depends on labor
income only and that the graduate wage is an increasing concave func-
tion g of the grades earned in individual exams (Gi); we assume that
c2 = wg(1 ¡ `2), where w is the non-graduate wage and g a sort of
mark-up due to university performance.
To simplify notation in the equations we have dropped the index for
the individual. We consider the grades (Gi) earned in the exams to be an
indicator of academic performance and deﬁne g as follows:




This formulation simpliﬁes the model, is coherent with the hypothesis
of an increasing concave relationship between wage and grade earned in the
single exams and allows us to obtain some predictions which will be tested
in the empirical analysis.
The grade earned in each of the exams is a function of the time devoted to
self-study, of the time spent attending lectures and of unobserved individual
ability (ei): Gi = G(si;ai)ei. We assume that ei is log-normally (i.e. asym-
metrically) distributed with mean zero. Consumption in the second period




ln(G(si;ai)ei)(1 ¡ `2) : (2)
Each student maximizes the expected utility of equation (1) subject to
the ﬁrst period time constraint (see point 2) and the budget constraint in
7This is coherent with a labor market with institutional constraints on working hours.
8Since we are mainly interested in full-time students, we neglect work activity in the
ﬁrst period. Hence, assuming that students cannot borrow against their future incomes
ﬁrst period consumption is exogenous.



















where E0[:] is the expectation operator at time 0, i.e. at university en-
rollment. In what follows we drop the time index. The choice variables are
the study time si and the course attendance time ai in the N courses.







`1, for every i,j, (where u0
: indicates ﬁrst derivative). The












Gi for i = 1:::N
where we deﬁned µ ´ ¯w(1 ¡ `2). u0
c2 indicates the ﬁrst derivative of second
period utility with respect to consumption and G0
si, G0
ai are ﬁrst derivatives
of grade in exam i with respect to self-study and lecture attendance, respec-
tively.
This is a system of 2N equations in 2N unknown variables. In what
follows we suppose that the grade earned in course i is a constant elasticity
function of its arguments, course attendance and self-study. The elasticities
are denoted with "ai and "si, respectively. In particular, we assume a Cobb-
Douglas relationship between grade earned in course i, time devoted to study




i ei, where zi is a
course speciﬁc scale parameter. The Cobb-Douglas9 is a popular speciﬁca-
tion in the empirical literature10 and the main reason for choosing it is to
obtain theoretical implications that can be applied to the existing empirical
literature. The speciﬁcation can be generalized to include also person speciﬁc
attributes such as individual ability or pre-university exam scores (which are
considered in the empirical speciﬁcation).
The previous system can be written as:
siu0
`1 = µE(u0
c2)"si for i = 1:::N (3)
°aiu0
`1 = µE(u0
c2)"ai for i = 1:::N (4)
9i.e. the double logarithmic speciﬁcation (which regresses the logarithm of the speciﬁ-
cation on the logarithm of the inputs).























i.e. if "ai > 0 and "si > 0, ai and si are positively related11. Once account
is taken of travel times to attend courses, the optimal ratio between time
devoted to course attendance and time devoted to self-study is given by the
ratio between the grade elasticities with respect to the two time inputs.
The ratio between self-study (course attendance) in two diﬀerent courses
must be equal to the ratio between the elasticities of performance to self-
study (course attendance) in the two courses.
To solve the problem, we sum across all the equations (3) and (4). On
the left hand side we ﬁnd
P
i(si + °ai), which is equal to 1 ¡ `1. Hence:
u
0





("si + "ai) :
In order to obtain an explicit solution for the maximization problem, we
impose further structure on the problem and suppose that ut = ·ct + ln(`t)
for t = 1;2, so that u0
`1 = 1
`1 and u0
c2 = ·. Therefore we obtain:
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i) + ln(ei) : (6)


















1¡½ is the constant elasticity of substitution between self-study and attendance times.
Hence there is complementarity between the two inputs.
8Summing across equations we also obtain g, our index of overall academic
performance:













i ln(zi). Hence, it straightforwardly follows that in this frame-
work by estimating equation (7) the coeﬃcients of the logarithms of atten-
dance and self-study in a speciﬁc course provide the elasticity of the grade








i ) = "si. An analogous expression holds for
hours of course attendance.
Another point that we want to stress is that by replacing the expression
for s¤




i) = ln(zi) + "siln(°
"si
"ai
) + ("ai + "si)ln(a
¤
i) + ln(ei) : (8)
Therefore, in our set-up a regression omitting the time devoted to self-
study produces an overestimation of the elasticity of performance with re-
spect to time of lecture attendance, the size of the overestimation being the
elasticity of performance with respect to self-study time; that is, the coeﬃ-
cient of a¤
i is the total elasticity of scale12.
4 The empirical analysis
4.1 Data Description
The Faculty of Economics of the University of Ancona (Italy) each year
conducts a survey on the quality of its educational delivery. A questionnaire is
compiled by students when they apply for the second and the third academic
years, in the period between September and October. We analyze the survey
conducted in 1999, referring to students applying for their second academic
year. Hence, we consider the performance during the ﬁrst year (October 1998
- October 1999).
Some information on the Italian university system and the University
of Ancona may be useful. In Italy, students are not obliged to take exams
at the end of courses. In fact, they may take them in some ﬁxed periods
12This result is robust to the CES speciﬁcation. In fact, the expression in the case of
















9of the year throughout the duration of the degree course. Hence, in our
data students have taken a diﬀerent number of exams and passed a diﬀerent
number of exams in the ﬁrst year 13. Furthermore, course attendance is not
compulsory.
At the Faculty of Economics of the University of Ancona students should
pass 5 exams during the ﬁrst academic year (Mathematics, Economics, Ac-
counting, Economic History and Law).
The 1999 survey contains data on 411 out of 424 ﬁrst year students.
Students who did not apply for the second year (drop-outs) were interviewed
by telephone. We dropped from the sample 33 students who declared that
they were working full-time14 and a further seven students who did not report
data on the type of secondary school attended or the grade obtained in the
secondary school ﬁnal exam.15 The ﬁnal sample comprises 371 individuals.
The survey gathers a wealth of information on individual and family
characteristics, such as parent’s education, social class and incomes, domicile,
grade in the secondary school ﬁnal exam, etc. The most important items
of information concerning student time allocation and performance are the
following:
² the percentage of lectures attended by course, in classes;
² the number of hours of self-study by course, in classes;
² the grade eventually earned in each of the course exams. The minimum
grade needed to pass an exam is 18/30 while the maximum grade is
30/30 cum laude (codiﬁed as 31/30). Moreover, the grade is recorded,
and therefore observable, only if the exam is passed.
Some descriptive statistics concerning course attendance (measured as
the percentage of courses attended) and self-study are presented in table 1
and 2, respectively.
On average, students passed 2.62 exams out of the legal 5 of the ﬁrst
academic year.16
13Since we use only information on the ﬁrst academic year, for some individuals we do
not observe the grades in the exams not yet taken, but which will be probably taken later
on during the degree course. Therefore, these are censored data.
14This was because the theoretical analysis of section 3 considers only full-time students.
15These observations were dropped because we consider the two missing variables central
to explanation of academic performance. In all the other cases of missing we included a
missing value dummy.
16This low ﬁgure may also depend on the fact that most students ﬁlled in the ques-
tionnaire before the September-October exam session, which is part of the ﬁrst academic
year.
10Table 1: Distribution of % course attendance (371 obs.), percentages
Course not attended 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100%
Law 7.55 19.95 9.97 15.09 47.44
Mathematics 7.28 5.66 2.96 7.82 76.28
Accounting 8.63 11.05 4.85 10.78 64.69
Economics 8.63 8.89 4.58 7.82 70.08
Ec. History 9.16 40.43 12.94 11.05 26.42
Note. The sum by row may not be 100 because of roundings.
Table 2: Distribution of self-study hours (371 obs.), percentages
Course not studied 0-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400+
Law 38.81 7.28 16.44 19.68 12.67 5.12
Mathematics 33.96 13.75 20.75 18.33 9.16 4.04
Accounting 31.81 12.67 25.07 18.33 9.7 2.43
Economics 44.2 4.85 18.6 17.25 10.51 4.58
Ec. History 53.64 16.98 16.71 8.36 2.43 1.89
Note. The sum by row may not be 100 because of roundings.
4.2 Empirical strategy and results
The theoretical model of section 3 gives us some useful suggestions for the
empirical work.
Since, as said, the percentage of lecture attended and self-study time
are reported in the survey in categorical form, we ﬁrst run some interval
regressions (see for instance Stewart 1983) and kept the predicted values.17
This provided continuous measures of lecture attendance time and self-study
time which were then used at a second stage for the estimation of the single
exam and the overall educational performance functions for ﬁrst year students
(see equation (7)).18 Among the regressors in the interval regressions for
lecture attendance and self-study, which are to be interpreted as reduced
form models for the optimal demand of the two choice variables, we included:
type of motivation for continuing in higher education, parents’ education and
social class, parents’ income, gender, age at enrollment, domicile during the
ﬁrst academic year, grade at secondary school ﬁnal exam interacted with
17The predicted values used are those conditioned on the fact the the eﬀective value is
observed in a speciﬁc interval. We used the intreg STATA command, see the STATA 7
Reference Su-Z manual, pp.186-187 (STATA 2001).
18Predicted percentages of lectures attended by course were converted into predicted
hours of attendance.
11Table 3: Descriptive statistics for predicted attendance and self-study hours
by course
Variable N. obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Attendance
Law 371 37.60 21.35
Mathematics 371 64.31 24.17
Accounting 371 58.30 27.39
Economics 371 60.47 26.78
Ec. History 371 26.25 21.05
Self-study
Law 371 146.49 146.77
Mathematics 371 132.75 131.04
Accounting 371 132.77 123.47
Economics 371 129.27 139.99
Ec. History 371 68.74 99.84
type of secondary school and type of secondary school attended. These are
the variables which are likely to aﬀect student preferences and the costs and
beneﬁts of course attendance and self-study.
Results of the interval regressions are shown in tables A2 and A3 in
the appendix. Table A1 reports the variables description. Some descriptive
statistics for predicted lecture attendance (a) and self-study (s) for the ﬁve
courses of the ﬁrst year are listed in table 3. For the sake of brevity, here
we do not comment on the interval regressions results but focus only on the
evidence concerning student academic performance.
A ﬁrst main diﬀerence with respect to speciﬁcations previously used in
the literature is that our educational performance regression does not include
both exogenous variables which aﬀect student performance only through their
eﬀect on lecture attendance and self-study and endogenous variables (lecture
attendance and self-study times), since we believe that such a speciﬁcation
has no theoretical foundation. In fact, we are interested either in the reduced
form, i.e. the speciﬁcation including only exogenous variables, or in the struc-
tural form, i.e. the form including only the ﬁrst determinants of educational
performance, both endogenous and exogenous, but excluding variables af-
fecting educational performance via their eﬀect on the endogenous variables
or previous secondary school performance only.19 A second diﬀerence is that
19Monk (1990), for instance, observes that many home and background variables have
been included among the inputs into educational production functions without a strong
theoretical rationale for their importance (p. 24). The idea of considering the educational
12we consider lecture attendance and self-study as endogenous. Our procedure
is equivalent to an instrumental variables (IV) estimation, where the identi-
fying instruments are the exogenous variables excluded from the educational
performance functions. The exclusion of a wide range of individual or family
background variables is motivated by the fact that some of them aﬀect only
study and lecture attendance times (such as the geographic residence once
controlled for secondary school performance), while other factors, such as
the family background, are expected to aﬀect only early school performance
(see the life-course hypothesis in Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). However, we
estimated also speciﬁcations of the exam performance functions including
all the variables used in the interval regressions. In general, the likelihood
ratio (LR) tests could not reject the null hypothesis of the joint statistical
insigniﬁcance of the identifying instruments 20 (since they are likely to aﬀect
academic performance only via their impact on choice variables).
It is worth noting that:
² in the theoretical model s¤
i and a¤
i are the optimal self-study and lecture
attendance times allocated to the single courses along the degree course
duration. However, in our data sample we observe only the amount of
self-study and course attendance times allocated to the ﬁrst academic
year;
² we do not observe the grades for ﬁrst year exams not attempted during
the ﬁrst year;
² we do not observe the grades for exams attempted but not passed (i.e.
grade < 18). ;
² grades higher than 31 (i.e. 30=30 cum laude) are recorded as 31.
In order to estimate the exam performance regressions we used a censored
regression model, namely the cnreg command in STATA21. In particular,
for the observations with missing grades we imputed an observed grade Go
i
equal to 17.999 (since the minimum passing grade is 18) and set the variable
indicating censoring at -1, i.e. left censoring: the true or latent grade G¤
i is
known only to be less or equal to 17.999. For the observations with grades
equal to 31 we set the variable indicating censoring at 1, i.e. right censoring:
the true grade is known only to be greater or equal to the value recorded (i.e.
31). The log likelihood for the single exam performance model is:
production function as a part of a broader utility maximization problem is already present
in McGuckin and Winker (1979).
20e.g. the value of the LR-test for model M2 in table 9 is Â2(47)=46.16, p-value=0.51.




































where j 2 C are the uncensored observations, j 2 L are the left censored
observations and j 2 R the right censored observations, Φ(:) is the standard
normal distribution function, x are the covariates included in the exam per-
formance regressions, ¯ are the coeﬃcients to be estimated and ¾ is the error
term (ln(e)) standard deviation.
Included as explanatory variables in the structural form of the educational
performance function were the type of secondary school and the secondary
school ﬁnal exam score interacted with the type of secondary school,22 as
proxies for ability and the type and amount of previous knowledge, and lec-
ture attendance and self-study time. We considered four types of secondary
school: classical or scientiﬁc liceo,23 technical school, accounting school, other
secondary schools24.
The results of the single exam estimates are shown in tables 4-8.
The tables show the results for two type of models. Model 1 (M1) includes
pre-university school characteristics and time of lecture attendance, while
model 2 (M2) also includes time devoted to self-study. Here, we comment on
the performance elasticities with respect to attendance and self-study time
only. For all exams we ﬁnd that including the time of lecture attendance only
produces an overestimation of the elasticity of course attendance compared
to the complete speciﬁcation (model 2). In most exams,25 the size of the over-
estimation is surprisingly very close to the elasticity estimated for self-study
time in model 2, as predicted by our simple theoretical model. This implies
that educational performance regressions omitting time devoted to self-study
may produce substantially biased estimates of the elasticity of performance
with respect to lecture attendance and wrong policy implications.
22We do not address here the issue of the potential endogeneity of previous school results.
This problem is treated for instance in Dolton et al. (2001), who disregard, however, the
potential endogeneity of student time allocation.
23Liceo is a academic high school usually chosen by individuals who plan to undertake
a university education.
24Such as vocational secondary schools.
25The sole exception is Law.
14Table 4: Performance equation for Law (Censored regression)
Law M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 0.880 ¤¤ 0.23 0.00 0.677 ¤¤ 0.14 0.00
grade technical 0.519 0.75 0.49 0.309 0.61 0.61
grade accounting 0.751 ¤¤ 0.19 0.00 0.751 ¤¤ 0.15 0.00
grade other secondary 1.173 ¤¤ 0.32 0.00 0.756 ¤¤ 0.23 0.00
dummy technical 1.336 3.08 0.66 1.291 2.46 0.60
dummy accounting 0.569 1.18 0.63 -0.261 0.80 0.74
dummy other secondary -1.171 1.53 0.44 -0.367 1.07 0.73
attendance time 0.043 ¤¤ 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.97
self study time 0.101 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant -0.672 0.90 0.46 -0.089 0.56 0.87
left censored observations 187 187
uncensored observations 179 179
right censored observations 5 5
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.873
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The
reference group are students from liceo.
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level.
Table 5: Performance equation for Mathematics (Censored regression)
Mathematics M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 0.689 ¤¤ 0.11 0.00 0.597 ¤¤ 0.11 0.00
grade technical 0.878 0.71 0.22 0.892 0.80 0.26
grade accounting 1.138 ¤¤ 0.24 0.00 0.906 ¤¤ 0.19 0.00
grade other secondary 0.691 0.43 0.11 0.659 ¤ 0.38 0.08
dummy technical -1.059 2.65 0.69 -1.429 3.01 0.63
dummy accounting -2.058 ¤¤ 1.03 0.05 -1.426 0.88 0.11
dummy other secondary -0.223 1.72 0.90 -0.428 1.51 0.78
attendance time 0.148 ¤¤ 0.03 0.00 0.065 ¤ 0.03 0.06
self study time 0.077 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant -0.179 0.48 0.71 0.184 0.47 0.70
left censored observations 182 182
uncensored observations 189 189
right censored observations 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.486 0.819
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The
reference group are students from liceo.
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level.
15Table 6: Performance equation for Accounting (Censored regression)
Accounting M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 0.369 ¤¤ 0.15 0.01 0.492 ¤¤ 0.11 0.00
grade technical 1.037 1.05 0.32 1.264 1.23 0.30
grade accounting 0.733 ¤¤ 0.16 0.00 0.540 ¤¤ 0.13 0.00
grade other secondary 1.068 ¤¤ 0.26 0.00 0.753 ¤¤ 0.20 0.00
dummy technical -2.702 4.04 0.50 -3.036 4.67 0.52
dummy accounting -1.292 0.86 0.13 -0.115 0.68 0.87
dummy other secondary -2.665 ¤¤ 1.19 0.03 -1.007 0.90 0.26
attendance time 0.165 ¤¤ 0.02 0.00 0.031 ¤¤ 0.02 0.05
self study time 0.100 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant 0.928 0.58 0.11 0.615 0.42 0.15
left censored observations 145 145
uncensored observations 224 224
right censored observations 2 2
Pseudo R2 0.422 1.000
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The
reference group are students from liceo.
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level.
Table 7: Performance equation for Economics (Censored regression)
Economics M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 0.942 ¤¤ 0.20 0.00 0.583 ¤¤ 0.15 0.00
grade technical 1.277 1.46 0.38 0.531 0.55 0.33
grade accounting 1.062 ¤¤ 0.22 0.00 0.801 ¤¤ 0.17 0.00
grade other secondary 1.592 ¤¤ 0.52 0.00 1.386 ¤¤ 0.39 0.00
dummy technical -1.520 5.50 0.78 0.132 2.12 0.95
dummy accounting -0.544 1.16 0.64 -0.923 0.90 0.31
dummy other secondary -2.712 2.24 0.23 -3.278 ¤ 1.69 0.05
attendance time 0.203 ¤¤ 0.06 0.00 0.084 ¤ 0.05 0.07
self study time 0.097 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant -1.462 ¤ 0.75 0.05 0.080 0.58 0.89
left censored observations 188 188
uncensored observations 172 172
right censored observations 11 11
Pseudo R2 0.297 0.750
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The
reference group are students from liceo.
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level.
16Table 8: Performance equation for Economic History (Censored regression)
Economic History M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 0.156 0.22 0.47 0.142 0.12 0.24
grade technical 1.525 1.09 0.16 0.528 0.85 0.54
grade accounting 0.614 ¤¤ 0.28 0.03 0.262 0.18 0.15
grade other secondary 1.054 ¤ 0.58 0.07 0.609 ¤ 0.37 0.10
dummy technical -5.427 4.32 0.21 -1.541 3.33 0.64
dummy accounting -1.948 1.39 0.16 -0.533 0.86 0.54
dummy other secondary -3.615 2.43 0.14 -1.886 1.47 0.20
attendance time 0.115 ¤¤ 0.02 0.00 0.030 ¤¤ 0.01 0.02
self study time 0.123 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant 2.037 ¤¤ 0.83 0.02 2.015 ¤¤ 0.46 0.00
left censored observations 206 206
uncensored observations 164 164
right censored observations 1 1
Pseudo R2 0.141 0.970
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The
reference group are students from liceo.
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% statistical level.
In all exams we ﬁnd that the elasticity of performance with respect to
time of attendance is lower than that with respect to self-study. Quantitative
and qualitative results diﬀer across exams. In Law, only the time devoted to
self-study seems to aﬀect the grade obtained. Increasing hours of self-study
by 1% raises the grade by 0:10% . In Mathematics both course attendance
and self-study time are important for the exam performance, increasing the
former by 1% increases the grade by 0:065% while raising the hours of study
by 1% raises the grade by 0:077%. For Accounting the level of the perfor-
mance elasticity of attendance is much lower than that of self-study, 0:031
and 0:10, respectively. In Economics both attendance and self-study have a
positive eﬀect upon performance with elasticities of 0:084 and 0:097, respec-
tively. Last but not least, attendance and self-study both have a statistically
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on performance in economic history, with elasticities
of 0:03 and 0:123, respectively.
In brief, we ﬁnd that there are marked diﬀerences in the beneﬁts produced
by lecture attendance and self-study in terms of grades earned across exams.
There are exams, such as Law, in which only self-study seems to have a posi-
tive eﬀect in terms of performance, exams, such as Accounting and Economic
History, in which self-study is more eﬀective in terms of higher performance
and ﬁnally exams, such as Economics and Mathematics, in which the gains
17Table 9: Overall performance equation (IV)
Overall performance M1 M2
coef. s.e. p-val. coef. s.e. p-val.
grade liceo 2.919 ¤¤ 0.39 0.00 2.236 ¤¤ 0.19 0.00
grade technical 5.722 ¤¤ 1.98 0.00 3.633 ¤¤ 0.54 0.00
grade accounting 4.547 ¤¤ 0.41 0.00 3.489 ¤¤ 0.20 0.00
grade other secondary 5.528 ¤¤ 0.57 0.00 4.033 ¤¤ 0.33 0.00
dummy technical -11.661 7.68 0.13 -5.997 ¤¤ 2.19 0.01
dummy accounting -6.642 ¤¤ 2.19 0.00 -5.138 ¤¤ 1.14 0.00
dummy other secondary -10.571 ¤¤ 2.62 0.00 -7.420 ¤¤ 1.49 0.00
attendance Law 0.032 0.06 0.58 0.029 0.03 0.30
attendance Mathematics 0.143 ¤¤ 0.06 0.02 0.060 ¤ 0.03 0.05
attendance Accounting 0.156 ¤¤ 0.07 0.02 0.078 ¤¤ 0.04 0.03
attendance Economics 0.289 ¤¤ 0.07 0.00 0.100 ¤¤ 0.04 0.00
attendance Ec. History 0.038 0.05 0.46 0.021 0.02 0.37
self study Law 0.094 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
self study Mathematics 0.059 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
self study Accounting 0.081 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
self study Economics 0.118 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
self study Ec. History 0.112 ¤¤ 0.01 0.00
constant 1.173 1.49 0.45 3.793 ¤¤ 0.75 0.00
n. observations 371 371
adj R2 0.656 0.911
Note. Standard errors (s.e.) are computed with bootstrap (500 replications). The reference
group are students from liceo. ¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% statistical level ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the
5% statistical level.
18of performance obtained by increasing attendance and self-study are very
similar in magnitude. In general, therefore, performance gains related to
increasing attendance are higher in quantitative disciplines.
As we have seen, an alternative approach to estimating the elasticities of
performance with respect to attendance and self-study time for the individual
exams would be to estimate the overall performance regression (6) directly
obtained from our analytical model. However, before estimating equation
(6) we had to ﬁll the missing observations related to the exams not passed
(or not attempted). This was necessary because we were not able to take
account of the censoring of the observations for the overall performance,
since individuals may have attempted and passed a very diﬀerent number of
exams. Hence, we imputed the predicted exam performance obtained from
the single exam regressions to individuals for which the mark in some exams
was not observed. The results are shown in table 9. We obtained qualitatively
equivalent results and slightly diﬀerent elasticities with respect to the single
performance regressions.26 We interpret this as evidence that our analytical
model, though simple, ﬁts the data remarkably well.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a theoretical model of student time allo-
cation and academic performance. The model accounts for the endogeneity
of both course attendance and self-study and the fact that a student when a
student decides the optimal values of these choice variables s/he is subject to
a common time constraint. We obtain from the model some testable impli-
cations. In particular that regressions omitting self-study time overestimate
the elasticity of exam performance with respect to lecture attendance and
that the size of the overestimation is exactly the elasticity of performance
with respect to self-study. We then have estimated an empirical model of
student performance using data on ﬁrst year economics students at the Uni-
versity of Ancona (Italy). Both theoretical implications were conﬁrmed by
the empirical analysis. Moreover, we found that the relative importance of
self-study time and attendance varies across exams. Attendance appears
to produce performance gains especially in quantitative disciplines such as
Mathematics and Economics, while self-study time is central for performance
in non-quantitative disciplines such as Law and Economic History. A ma-
jor implication of our analysis is that estimates of educational performance
26This might be due to the cross-correlations between attendance and self-study in
diﬀerent exams and that in the overall performance regression we are working for some
individuals with latent (imputed) performance.
19functions excluding self-study time are likely to produce an over-evaluation
of the elasticity of performance with respect to lecture attendance and to
generate wrong policy directions.
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21Appendix
Table A1: Variables legend
Name Description
mot1 Motivation for faculty choice: unknown
mot2 Motivation for faculty choice: distance
mot3 Motivation for faculty choice: professional project (reference)
mot4 Motivation for faculty choice: employment prospects
mot5 Motivation for faculty choice: cultural reasons
mot6 Motivation for faculty choice: social status
mot7 Motivation for faculty choice: advice of parents or friends
mot8 Motivation for faculty choice: to improve employment prospects
eduf1 Father’s education: elementary school or lower (reference)
eduf2 Father’s education: low secondary school
eduf3 Father’s education: high secondary school
eduf4 Father’s education: university degree
eduf5 Father’s education: unknown
edum1 Mother’s education: elementary school or lower (reference)
edum2 Mother’s education: low secondary school
edum3 Mother’s education: high secondary school
edum4 Mother’s education: university degree
edum5 Mother’s education: unknown
scf1 Father’s social class: professional
scf2 Father’s social class: intermediate
scf3 Father’s social class: skilled non manual
scf4 Father’s social class: skilled manual
scf5 Father’s social class: unskilled
scf6 Father’s social class: other
scf7 Father’s social class: unknown
scf8 Father’s social class: non worker (reference)
scm1 Mother’s social class: professional
scm2 Mother’s social class: intermediate
22continue table A1. Variables legend
Name Description
scm3 Mother’s social class: skilled non manual
scm4 Mother’s social class: skilled manual
scm5 Mother’s social class: unskilled
scm6 Mother’s social class: other
scm7 Mother’s social class: unknown
scm8 Mother’s social class: non worker (reference)
yfa1 Monthly father’s income: unknown
yfa2 Monthly father’s income: no income
yfa3 Monthly father’s income: < 516 C = (reference)
yfa4 Monthly father’s income: 516-774 C =
yfa5 Monthly father’s income: 774-1032 C =
yfa6 Monthly father’s income: 1032-1549 C =
yfa7 Monthly father’s income: 1549-2065 C =
yfa8 Monthly father’s income: 2065-3098 C =
ymo1 Monthly mother’s income: unknown
ymo2 Monthly mother’s income: no income
ymo3 Monthly mother’s income: < 516 C = (reference)
ymo4 Monthly mother’s income: 516-774 C =
ymo5 Monthly mother’s income: 774-1032 C =
ymo6 Monthly mother’s income: 1032-1549 C =
ymo7 Monthly mother’s income: 2065-3098 C =
male Male (reference)
female Female
grade1 Grade in ﬁnal secondary school exam: liceo
grade2 Grade in ﬁnal secondary school exam: technical school
grade3 Grade in ﬁnal secondary school exam: accounting school
grade4 Grade in ﬁnal secondary school exam: other secondary school
dummy d1 Dummy for liceo (reference)
dummy d2 Dummy for technical school
dummy d3 Dummy for accounting school
dummy d4 Dummy for other secondary school
dom1 Residence during the ﬁrst year: unknown
dom2 Residence during the ﬁrst year: outside Ancona
dom3 Residence during the ﬁrst year: partly in Ancona
dom4 Residence during the ﬁrst year: Ancona (reference)
age Age at enrollment
23Table A2: Interval regression estimates for hours of lecture attendance
Course
Variable Law Mathematics Accounting Economics Ec. History
coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val
mot1 -10.98 -1.20 -12.25 -1.70 -1.05 -0.12 -4.54 -0.55 -6.16 -0.69
mot2 9.44 1.38 9.28 1.72 17.61 2.75 7.61 1.23 6.10 0.91
mot4 -4.90 -1.27 1.42 0.46 2.24 0.61 2.62 0.74 -2.51 -0.66
mot5 0.53 0.07 -2.61 -0.42 -15.47 -2.11 -18.84 -2.65 -8.92 -1.17
mot6 -22.17 -0.69 -10.79 -0.42 -1.33 -0.04 15.47 0.53 6.82 0.22
mot7 -14.23 -1.04 -1.13 -0.10 -5.68 -0.44 -17.40 -1.40 6.02 0.45
mot8 -24.03 -1.42 -7.33 -0.55 2.94 0.19 5.52 0.36 -10.91 -0.66
eduf2 5.64 1.03 -1.39 -0.32 2.19 0.42 -2.36 -0.47 2.87 0.53
eduf3 -0.33 -0.05 -5.47 -1.08 -2.63 -0.44 -5.73 -0.98 2.18 0.34
eduf4 0.03 0.00 -3.37 -0.53 -5.70 -0.75 -1.93 -0.26 -8.79 -1.11
eduf5 22.34 1.52 -1.46 -0.13 28.08 2.04 14.02 1.05 10.02 0.69
edum2 -4.95 -0.88 -1.11 -0.25 -1.73 -0.33 6.96 1.37 -3.86 -0.70
edum3 -6.95 -1.05 -5.14 -0.98 0.23 0.04 10.25 1.70 -4.13 -0.64
edum4 -6.55 -0.73 -5.53 -0.78 1.82 0.22 16.61 2.04 2.76 0.31
edum5 -9.31 -0.70 -16.35 -1.55 -25.73 -2.06 -13.25 -1.09 -2.68 -0.20
scf1 9.54 1.06 7.93 1.11 12.97 1.53 8.85 1.08 -7.48 -0.84
scf2 4.08 0.44 2.54 0.35 6.78 0.78 4.72 0.56 6.89 0.76
scf3 15.33 1.71 10.61 1.50 8.53 1.01 9.50 1.17 2.68 0.31
scf4 1.09 0.13 -1.53 -0.23 -0.31 -0.04 -2.78 -0.36 -9.03 -1.08
scf5 -33.10 -1.34 13.68 0.70 -21.79 -0.95 -19.73 -0.89 -38.53 -1.60
scf6 7.45 0.59 13.81 1.39 -1.07 -0.09 14.08 1.23 -5.92 -0.48
scf7 -3.23 -0.27 -1.03 -0.11 15.56 1.40 1.65 0.15 -3.38 -0.29
scm1 -15.71 -1.47 -8.47 -1.00 7.62 0.76 2.89 0.30 27.92 2.66
scm2 1.29 0.18 5.66 1.01 2.08 0.31 -2.28 -0.35 2.48 0.35
scm3 -13.95 -1.97 -12.93 -2.31 -7.47 -1.12 -10.46 -1.62 4.62 0.66
scm4 5.38 0.87 4.70 0.96 9.41 1.61 8.34 1.48 13.73 2.26
scm5 -3.24 -0.29 -4.77 -0.53 13.38 1.25 5.52 0.53 33.56 3.00
scm6 -5.67 -0.51 -12.45 -1.41 -1.71 -0.16 -11.64 -1.15 6.80 0.62
scm7 3.15 0.39 2.60 0.40 -3.89 -0.51 -6.17 -0.84 10.97 1.38
yfa1 -2.77 -0.33 -7.93 -1.21 -14.73 -1.89 -9.72 -1.29 -8.88 -1.09
yfa2 2.45 0.15 -18.88 -1.49 -3.06 -0.20 -1.24 -0.08 -4.36 -0.28
yfa4 -4.26 -0.51 -7.86 -1.19 -11.63 -1.48 -3.35 -0.44 -4.66 -0.57
yfa5 0.70 0.09 -6.95 -1.08 -7.89 -1.04 -11.43 -1.55 -10.53 -1.32
yfa6 -1.22 -0.14 -15.97 -2.27 -12.63 -1.51 -13.96 -1.73 -11.29 -1.30
yfa7 -0.45 -0.05 -10.04 -1.32 -11.40 -1.27 -12.36 -1.42 -14.64 -1.56
yfa8 -13.70 -1.30 -21.63 -2.59 -35.95 -3.63 -28.69 -2.99 -12.44 -1.20
24continue table A2. Interval regression estimates for hours of lecture atten-
dance
Course
Variable Law Mathematics Accounting Economics Ec. History
coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val
ymo1 11.31 1.53 4.20 0.72 1.83 0.26 2.55 0.38 12.78 1.76
ymo2 6.01 0.79 -2.82 -0.47 0.43 0.06 -0.51 -0.07 2.16 0.29
ymo4 5.01 0.69 -4.37 -0.75 -10.50 -1.53 -9.31 -1.40 -6.11 -0.85
ymo5 6.88 0.95 -4.08 -0.71 -7.02 -1.03 -4.43 -0.67 2.51 0.35
ymo6 6.53 0.63 9.74 1.19 -3.28 -0.34 -14.22 -1.51 6.02 0.59
ymo7 9.77 0.86 10.13 1.13 -7.17 -0.67 -8.70 -0.84 2.31 0.21
female -0.69 -0.19 -2.38 -0.81 3.14 0.90 -3.83 -1.13 -2.78 -0.76
grade1 -42.92 -1.55 -35.43 -1.62 34.90 1.34 34.96 1.38 5.17 0.19
grade2 -84.88 -2.14 -4.94 -0.16 28.23 0.76 29.00 0.80 -1.11 -0.03
grade3 -166.17 -2.58 -168.16 -3.30 -59.63 -0.99 -68.71 -1.17 63.95 1.01
grade4 -0.47 -1.22 -0.09 -0.31 0.38 1.06 0.63 1.82 0.90 2.40
dummy d2 2.82 2.11 3.03 2.86 1.54 1.22 1.76 1.44 -0.57 -0.43
dummy d3 0.43 1.04 0.48 1.45 -0.45 -1.15 -0.26 -0.69 0.59 1.45
dummy d4 1.21 1.66 -0.26 -0.44 -0.39 -0.57 -0.19 -0.29 0.91 1.27
dom1 -7.29 -0.78 -23.65 -3.19 -12.52 -1.42 -13.17 -1.54 -6.59 -0.72
dom2 -2.77 -0.71 -0.88 -0.28 -4.20 -1.14 -5.58 -1.57 -7.41 -1.93
dom3 -3.71 -0.71 2.26 0.54 -1.95 -0.39 -4.70 -0.98 0.74 0.14
age -5.96 -3.89 -8.57 -7.16 -6.47 -4.51 -7.02 -5.05 -2.48 -1.65
constant 192.39 5.12 260.85 8.83 185.00 5.24 189.64 5.55 55.68 1.51
N. obs. 371 371 371 371 371
LR-test* 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Note. ¤ p-values. The dependent variables is the number of hours of lecture attendance.
For the description of the explanatory variables see table A1.
25Table A3: Interval regression estimates for hours of self-study
Course
Variable Law Mathematics Accounting Economics Ec. History
coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val
mot1 111.83 2.52 -26.28 -0.73 -25.54 -0.74 38.86 0.99 27.74 0.98
mot2 67.71 2.31 55.17 2.03 26.94 1.05 7.35 0.25 -10.22 -0.49
mot4 39.85 2.49 -4.07 -0.27 -16.12 -1.10 21.89 1.32 -20.67 -1.74
mot5 -4.42 -0.12 -28.61 -0.93 -74.54 -2.55 -41.16 -1.23 4.50 0.19
mot6 632.78 0.04 -103.73 -0.83 7.34 0.06 99.78 0.72 73.51 0.73
mot7 -40.81 -0.60 -53.72 -0.99 -53.11 -1.03 -66.49 -1.14 -53.42 -1.28
mot8 -29.16 -0.42 -37.97 -0.57 -43.59 -0.69 -55.63 -0.76 -23.03 -0.45
eduf2 8.85 0.38 -5.93 -0.27 -19.91 -0.96 -33.92 -1.44 8.81 0.53
eduf3 38.66 1.37 12.90 0.51 -21.33 -0.88 -30.79 -1.11 3.83 0.19
eduf4 10.36 0.29 54.66 1.70 -18.48 -0.60 1.52 0.04 14.95 0.60
eduf5 82.28 1.57 64.50 1.10 33.35 0.60 25.63 0.41 -2.58 -0.06
edum2 -20.25 -0.87 7.62 0.34 -0.25 -0.01 -2.35 -0.10 -23.38 -1.37
edum3 -40.52 -1.50 -23.35 -0.89 -19.19 -0.77 1.35 0.05 -34.77 -1.72
edum4 24.88 0.67 10.00 0.28 -7.25 -0.22 2.52 0.07 -8.76 -0.32
edum5 -45.71 -0.92 -105.51 -2.01 52.42 1.03 -59.91 -1.05 50.00 1.22
scf1 35.42 0.98 -21.13 -0.59 45.30 1.33 13.87 0.36 -20.23 -0.73
scf2 -26.61 -0.68 -39.84 -1.09 16.09 0.46 -35.83 -0.91 -39.28 -1.39
scf3 3.48 0.09 -14.54 -0.41 54.04 1.60 -8.17 -0.21 -17.59 -0.64
scf4 48.57 1.32 -26.15 -0.77 -5.10 -0.16 -33.93 -0.92 -50.05 -1.91
scf5 -40.52 -0.36 -126.76 -1.31 -62.11 -0.67 -210.18 -2.00 -92.57 -1.22
scf6 -8.04 -0.16 -11.94 -0.24 -6.65 -0.14 58.96 1.09 -40.51 -1.05
scf7 75.57 1.60 -69.89 -1.49 48.65 1.09 7.80 0.15 -16.74 -0.46
scm1 43.82 1.06 5.47 0.13 30.65 0.76 8.29 0.18 60.27 1.83
scm2 6.40 0.23 -10.18 -0.36 -21.04 -0.78 33.62 1.10 24.54 1.13
scm3 36.00 1.15 -20.49 -0.73 8.06 0.30 27.76 0.91 17.30 0.80
scm4 -13.55 -0.52 2.16 0.09 17.69 0.76 21.48 0.81 20.33 1.07
scm5 -84.03 -1.94 -35.60 -0.79 58.94 1.37 17.41 0.36 66.45 1.90
scm6 -34.35 -0.82 -96.35 -2.19 35.57 0.84 34.47 0.72 -3.40 -0.10
scm7 7.32 0.20 -59.79 -1.86 5.09 0.17 41.32 1.18 32.36 1.30
yfa1 -9.60 -0.29 -11.89 -0.36 -47.61 -1.52 8.36 0.23 36.96 1.47
yfa2 73.49 0.88 84.48 1.31 11.40 0.19 14.54 0.21 16.03 0.32
yfa4 -27.77 -0.83 15.17 0.46 -24.74 -0.78 30.01 0.84 31.23 1.23
yfa5 -16.78 -0.52 10.83 0.34 -21.09 -0.69 21.68 0.63 25.25 1.03
yfa6 34.11 0.89 -5.79 -0.17 -41.10 -1.22 -11.59 -0.30 23.79 0.88
yfa7 -7.61 -0.18 -57.82 -1.53 -36.85 -1.02 16.76 0.41 11.68 0.40
yfa8 -24.93 -0.52 1.53 0.04 -63.97 -1.61 -33.49 -0.74 37.36 1.16
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Course
Variable Law Mathematics Accounting Economics Ec. History
coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val
ymo1 26.68 0.90 11.45 0.39 15.35 0.55 -16.10 -0.51 16.73 0.74
ymo2 0.75 0.02 -21.90 -0.73 16.48 0.57 -23.19 -0.71 36.87 1.59
ymo4 4.01 0.13 -23.75 -0.82 -9.72 -0.35 -71.04 -2.25 11.70 0.52
ymo5 -11.37 -0.38 -1.41 -0.05 12.25 0.45 -48.99 -1.56 17.35 0.78
ymo6 -7.39 -0.17 -9.58 -0.23 -1.07 -0.03 -51.62 -1.16 8.02 0.25
ymo7 28.01 0.54 13.43 0.30 -31.98 -0.75 -55.77 -1.14 -46.20 -1.34
female 0.47 0.03 0.12 0.01 22.66 1.61 -20.28 -1.27 1.12 0.10
grade1 514.34 1.98 -241.96 -2.20 4.94 0.05 15.77 0.13 -94.60 -1.12
grade2 -39.84 -0.35 -77.79 -0.49 -211.06 -1.41 120.81 0.71 -202.96 -1.66
grade3 -215.12 -1.24 -162.68 -0.64 -239.00 -0.99 -46.90 -0.17 -120.38 -0.61
grade4 1.24 0.79 -0.82 -0.54 -1.50 -1.05 3.42 2.10 -0.32 -0.28
dummy d2 -10.14 -1.94 1.65 0.31 2.94 0.59 3.48 0.61 1.53 0.37
dummy d3 1.67 0.99 3.19 1.94 -1.38 -0.88 3.04 1.71 1.00 0.79
dummy d4 6.39 1.98 0.55 0.19 2.83 1.03 0.63 0.20 3.67 1.63
dom1 47.61 1.24 30.60 0.82 -18.33 -0.52 -1.49 -0.04 7.04 0.24
dom2 4.11 0.25 8.53 0.55 8.10 0.55 -4.78 -0.28 -16.55 -1.38
dom3 -12.45 -0.59 37.76 1.80 36.06 1.81 6.83 0.30 -6.48 -0.40
age -32.33 -2.58 -19.05 -3.13 -17.26 -2.98 -16.00 -2.42 -10.91 -2.32
constant 749.83 3.00 587.18 3.93 545.38 3.85 319.52 1.97 312.29 2.71
N. obs. 371 371 371 371 371
LR-test* 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.31 0.12
Note. ¤ p-values. The dependent variables is the number of hours of self-study. For the
description of the explanatory variables see table A1.
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